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9.1  Introduction 
Many economic models are based on forward-looking behavior on the part 
of economic agents. Although it is often said that “expectations” about future 
events are important in these models, more precisely it is the probability distri- 
butions of future events that enter the models. For example, consumption and 
savings decisions of  an individual are thought to depend on what he or she 
thinks about future interest rates, the likelihood of dying, and the risk of sub- 
stantial future medical expenditures. According to our theories, decision mak- 
ers have probability distributions about these and other events, and they use 
them to make decisions about saving. This implies that data on these distribu- 
tions should be used in estimation. 
In a few microeconomic models, we have data on probability distributions 
that may plausibly be assumed to approximate those required by  the models. 
Life cycle models of consumption in which mortality risk helps determine sav- 
ing are the leading example, so we will put our discussion in the context of 
such models. 
Suppose that instantaneous utility, or felicity, is given by 
Lr  ’  u(cr) = - 
1 - y’ 
that the real interest rate r is constant, and that lifetime utility is time separable. 
Then, in a common formulation, the first-order conditions imply 
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1  dc,  - -h,  + r - p  -.-  - 
c,  dt  Y 
where p is the subjective time rate of discount and h, is mortality risk at time 
r. Thus, the rate of change of consumption depends on mortality risk h,  and will 
be negative if h, is large. Furthermore, from variations in h,, the risk aversion 
parameter y is econometrically identified. Notice that if  there is unobserved 
heterogeneity in h,, the coefficient on h, will tend toward zero, and y will be 
estimated to be large. That is, the consumption decisions of individuals will 
appear not to be responsive to variations in mortality risk. 
There have been two approaches to the problem of obtaining mortality risk 
data to be used in estimation based on the first-order condition above. In the 
first, an individual is assumed to believe his mortality risk is the same as that 
contained in  a life table, adjusted for age, and possibly sex and race. Under 
this assumption, if  the individual chooses consumption based on his beliefs 
about mortality risk, the analyst can use data from life tables to explain saving 
behavior (Hurd 1989b). 
The assumption that individuals have reasonable knowledge of the popula- 
tion mortality risk is considerably stronger than in typical demand analysis, 
which has only the reasonable requirement that individuals know their incomes 
and that they observe prices. Furthermore, in demand analysis, consumers have 
observed past variation in prices, and they have had the experience of choosing 
consumption through repeated trials. It is much less obvious how they would 
learn about the level of mortality risk in the population. Even if individuals do 
know about population average mortality risk, the average mortality risk of a 
cohort may not be well approximated by  the life tables because of changing 
risk. For example, members of  a younger cohort may forecast mortality im- 
provements, so the life tables overstate their mortality risk. 
A second approach to finding data on survival probabilities is especially 
pertinent for studies of life cycle behavior. It is based on the well-known varia- 
tion in mortality rates by  economic status (Kitagawa and Hauser 1973; Shor- 
rocks  1975; Hurd and Wise  1989; Jianakoplos, Menchik, and Irvine  1989; 
Feinstein  1992). If  the subjective probability distributions of  individuals of 
differing economic status vary in the same way as the observed mortality rates, 
using standard life tables in the model estimation will cause the parameters to 
be misestimated. A further consequence will be that a forecast of the distribu- 
tion of economic status will be incorrect: for example, poorer individuals who 
believe their mortality risk is higher than average will dissave faster than what 
is predicted by the model, causing future poverty rates to be underestimated 
by the model. Thus, the model will not be able to uncover a possible explana- 
tion of  the high poverty rates of  the oldest old: the poorest at retirement dis- 
saved fastest because of their subjective probability distributions of mortality 
risk. Variation in mortality risk according to observable characteristics can, in 261  Subjective Survival Curves and Life Cycle Behavior 
principle, be accounted for by estimating the variation in mortality outcomes 
in panel data that have been linked to the national death index as in Lillard and 
Weiss (1997). Although this method is undoubtedly an improvement over using 
unconditional life tables, it often depends on functional form assumptions for 
identification. To  see this, suppose that life table survival probabilities have 
been adjusted with covariates such as wealth in a model of life cycle wealth 
change in panel data. A typical estimating equation would be 
wr+I  = .f(wry{qr)), 
where w,  is wealth at time t and (4,)  is the path of survival rates. If (4,)  depends 
on wealth, then identification depends to a certain extent on functional form 
assumptions. This would be true of any covariate that is used to adjust (4,) and 
that also appears elsewhere in the utility maximization problem. An additional 
implication is that utility cannot be allowed to depend on age because it is the 
main determinant of {  4,)  . 
Even if adjustments can be made to life tables by using observed covariates, 
individuals are likely to have subjective probability distributions that are re- 
lated to unobservable as well as observable variables. It is these subjective 
probability distributions that should enter life cycle models of saving, so that 
any models that rely on observed probability distributions have intrinsic limita- 
tions. 
The importance of accounting for individual-level evaluation of  mortality 
risk is shown in the following example. It has been observed that there is a 
great deal of heterogeneity both in  the results of  saving (wealth) and in ob- 
served saving rates. From this point of  view,  the life cycle model of  saving 
is inadequate: for example, it cannot say why apparently similar individuals 
reach retirement with very different wealth levels (Hurd and Wise 1989), and 
why they save at different rates following retirement. It could be that most of 
the variation in saving behavior is due to taste differences across individuals 
or to forces we do not understand. An alternative explanation is that there is a 
great deal of  variation at the individual level in mortality risk, but we do not 
usually observe this variable. 
9.2  Data 
Our data come from the survey of  the Asset and Health Dynamics among 
the Oldest Old (AHEAD). This is a biennial panel of individuals born in 1923 
or earlier and their spouses. At baseline in 1993, it surveyed 8,222 individuals 
representative of the community-based population, except for oversamples of 
blacks, Hispanics, and Floridians. The main goal of  AHEAD is to provide 
panel data from the three broad domains of economic status, health, and family 
connections (Soldo et al. 1997). This is reflected in the questionnaire sections 
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Our main interest in this paper is in the data from the expectations section and 
its relationship to personal characteristics, particularly cognition. The survey 
has eight measures of subjective probabilities. In this paper we will give some 
descriptive statistics on them, but our main attention will be on the subjective 
probability of survival. We will show that it has informational content, but that 
it cannot be used without modification as a right-hand variable in a model of 
decision making because of cognition and observation error. We will propose 
and estimate a model of cognition error and then apply the model to life tables 
and to data from AHEAD to produce usable subjective probabilities of  sur- 
vival. 
Subjects were asked the following series of questions about the likelihood 
of future events: 
[Using any] number from 0 to 100 where “0” means that you think there is 
absolutely no chance and “100’ means that you think the event is absolutely 
sure to happen . . .  What do you think are the chances that: 
1.  You  will have to give major financial help to family members during 
the next 10 years? 
2.  You will receive major financial help from family members during the 
next 10 years? 
3. You will leave a financial inheritance? 
lfthe response was in the range [l,  1001 a follow-up question was asked: 
a.  You will leave an inheritance of at least $lO,OOO? 
lfthe response was in the range [31, 1001, a further  follow-up question 
was asked: 
b.  You will leave an inheritance of at least $lOO,OOO? 
4.  You will move to a nursing home over the next five years? 
5.  You will move during the next five years? 
6. Medical expenses will use up all your savings sometime during the 
7.  Your income will keep up with inflation during the next five years? 
In the following question asked of respondents (R)  of  age less than 90, A 
is 80 for R of age less than 70, 85 for R aged 70-74,  90 for R aged 75-79, 
95 for  R aged 80-84, and I00 for R aged 85-89: 
next five years? 
8.  You will live to be at least A? 263  Subjective Survival Curves and Life Cycle Behavior 
The expectations questions were not asked in proxy interviews in AHEAD; 
we have 7,393 responses to these questions. We treat responses to these ques- 
tions as if  they are subjective probabilities of the events, up  to possible re- 
porting error. 
The remaining variables employed in the analysis of  subjective survival 
probabilities are  quite  standard, except  for  measures of  cognitive  ability. 
AHEAD measures cognitive status in a battery of questions that aim to test a 
number of  domains of  cognition (Herzog and Wallace  1997): learning and 
memory are assessed by immediate and delayed recall from a list of  10 words 
that were read to the subject; reasoning, orientation, and attention are assessed 
from serial 7s (in which the subject is asked to subtract 7 from 100, and then 
to continue subtracting 7 from each successive difference for a total of  five 
subtractions), counting backward by  1, and the naming of public figures, dates, 
and objects. We  aggregate these responses into an indicator for cognitive dis- 
ability that is one if the number of correct answers to all the cognitive questions 
falls below a threshold level. This identifies, approximately, the lowest quartile 
in cognitive function. 
Subjective probabilities.  Subjective survival  probabilities measured  in  the 
Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) provide a benchmark for AHEAD re- 
sponses. The HRS subjects were aged 51-61.  Average survival probabilities to 
age 75 were 0.65, which is very close to a weighted average from a 1990 life 
table of 0.68 (Hurd and McGarry 1995). The survival probabilities vary with 
risk factors in the same way as mortality outcomes in the population. For ex- 
ample, those with higher socioeconomic status (measured by  education, in- 
come, or wealth) give higher survival probabilities; smokers give lower proba- 
bilities, moderate drinkers give higher probabilities than either teetotalers or 
heavy drinkers, and those whose parents survived to old age give higher sur- 
vival probabilities. These subjective survival probabilities correlate with actual 
mortality experience of subgroups of the HRS population. 
In the HRS subjects were asked about their probability of working past age 
62 or 65. These probabilities vary with financial and job characteristics in the 
same way as actual retirement outcomes. For example, those with defined ben- 
efit pension plans that offer early retirement give low probabilities of working 
past 62, those with employer-paid retiree health insurance give low probabili- 
ties, and those on jobs where it is usual to retire early give low probabilities 
(Hurd and McGarry 1993). We take these results to be good evidence that the 
HRS respondents understood questions about subjective probabilities and gave 
appropriate responses. However,  the AHEAD  population  is older and  has 
higher levels of cognitive impairment, so it may be that its responses are less 
appropriate. 
Table 9.1 shows the average and median survival probabilities from AHEAD 
and from 1992 life tables for the target ages used in the AHEAD survival ques- 
tion (e.g., 85 for subjects aged 70-74,90  for subjects aged 75-79,  with minor 264  Michael Hurd, Daniel McFadden, and Li Gan 
Table 9.1  Survival Probabilities 
Target Age 
85  90  95  100 
Means 
AHEAD  0.5 1  0.38  0.31  0.29 
Life table  0.50  0.33  0.16  0.05 
AHEAD  0.50  0.40  0.20  0.10 
Life table  0.55  0.37  0.18  0.06 
Medians 
Source: Hoynes, Hurd, and Chand (1995). 
spillover from timing of birthdays and interviews). As in the HRS, the AHEAD 
respondents at the younger ages (70-79)  have average subjective survival prob- 
abilities that are close to averages from life tables, but at older ages the aver- 
ages are substantially higher. Besides the obvious explanation that cognitive 
function declines with age, there are several other explanations. First, at base- 
line the AHEAD was a community-based survey: those in nursing homes and 
other institutional care facilities were excluded.  Thus AHEAD represents  a 
healthier population than is represented by life tables, with the implication that 
if the populations were the same the difference in survival probabilities would 
be reduced. Second, the questions about subjective probabilities were asked 
only in self-interviews, not in proxy interviews. Subjects who are interviewed 
by proxy have worse health, and because the frequency of  proxy interviews 
increased with age the population of self-interviews has better health than the 
complete  AHEAD population.  Third,  even  among  self-interviews  the  fre- 
quency of nonresponse to the questions about subjective probabilities increases 
with age, and nonrespondents have worse health than respondents. 
We have not attempted any analysis of the magnitude of the bias that results 
from these levels of sample selection, but they could be substantial: the overall 
rates of nonresponse to the question about survival probabilities are 12.2, 15.2, 
19.5, and 19.3 percent in our four age groups. We have no way to assess the 
bias resulting from the exclusion of the institutionalized population. Even with 
these kinds of  adjustments, however, it is unlikely that in the older two age 
groups the means would be reduced to the levels of the life tables. 
As shown in table 9.1, the medians from AHEAD and from the life tables 
are much closer than the means. Apparently, a few AHEAD respondents gave 
very high probabilities of survival, increasing the mean substantially. This is 
verified in figures 9.1 through 9.4, which show the distributions. The figures 
are noteworthy because even at advanced ages a number of respondents give 
survival probabilities of  1  .O. Particularly in the oldest age group, even a fairly 
small number of  such responses will increase the mean because the life table 
means are so small. The figures show a leftward shift with age in the distribu- 
tion as is expected. But in all the age groups a large fraction of respondents 
give what we call focal-point responses: 0.0, 0.5, or 1.0. The prevalence of 700 
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Fig. 9.4  Survival probabilities to age 100 among 85-89-year-olds 
focal-point responses shows that  the measure of  subjective probabilities in 
AHEAD cannot represent the true probabilities, both because the distribution 
of true probabilities should be continuous and because the true probabilities 
cannot be literally either zero or one. A major focus of  this paper is to learn 
about the determinants of  the likelihood that a respondent will give a focal- 
point response and to specify and estimate a model of cognition that will ac- 
count for the observed tendency for focal-point responses. 
9.3  Determinants of Focal-Point Responses 
In this section, we investigate the propensity to give a focal response (0.0, 
0.5 or 1.0) on one or more of the eight measures of  subjective probabilities. 
Our view is that the stated subjective probabilities, including focal responses, 
have  informational content, but it may  not be accurate to take them at face 
value. To investigate the question of  informational content, we use as a stan- 
dard of  comparison the view  that they are simply independent random re- 
sponses to a request to name a number between 0 and 100. 
Figure 9.5 shows the distribution of respondents according to the number of 
responses of zero to the probability questions. About 11 percent of the respon- 
dents to the subjective questions gave no zero responses, and the remainder 
gave a modal number of three. Of course, a response of zero can be appropriate 
depending on the event because some of the events have almost no stochastic 
element for some respondents. For example, the probability of receiving major 
financial help could be zero for someone with no family connections. Simi- 
larly, moving is controlled by  the respondent, and the probability of  moving 
could be close to zero. However, 59 respondents answered zero to seven of 
the subjective probability questions. In that the events are mostly controlled 267  Subjective Survival Curves and Life Cycle Behavior 
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Pig. 9.6  Focal subjective probabilities: distribution by number of 0.5s 
stochastic processes, with a mixture of level of control, it is hard to see how a 
well-informed assessment of the true probabilities could so often be zero. More 
likely these respondents did not understand the nature of the question or were 
uncooperative. 
Figure 9.6 gives a similar distribution with respect to responses of 0.5. The 
distribution is quite different from the distribution of zeros: 51 percent gave 
none, and the distribution declines sharply. Thus, although there is overall a 
fairly high propensity to give a 0.5, it is mainly concentrated among a few 
respondents and to a few events. The distribution of  1.0s has a similar shape 
(fig. 9.7) except that the left-hand part of the distribution is heavier. For ex- 








Fig. 9.7  Focal subjective probabilities: distribution  by number of 1.0s 
more of the subjective probabilities, whereas 7.2 percent gave responses of 0.5 
on three or more. The conclusion is that the focal point of  zero attracts the 
most responses, followed by 0.5. 
The distributions of focal-point responses indicate that some individuals of- 
ten  give focal-point responses to the  subjective probability questions, sug- 
gesting that there is an individual-level propensity to give a focal-point re- 
sponse that may be independent of  the event that is queried. To examine this 
we study the probability of giving a focal-point response to the question about 
the likelihood of  survival as a function of  the number of focal-point answers 
given to the other questions about subjective probabilities. For example, we 
specify that P(S = 0) = An,,),  where S = 0 means the survival probability is 
reported to be zero and n, is the number of zeros on the other subjective proba- 
bilities. If  the likelihood of giving a focal-point response to the survival ques- 
tion is independent of whether focal-point responses were given to the other 
subjective probability questions, we should find no relationship between n, and 
P(S = 0). 
Figure 9.8 shows the unconditional probability as a function of no.  About 16 
percent of the respondents report a survival probability of zero. Among those 
who have no zero responses on the other subjective probabilities, just 1 percent 
gave  a zero probability of  survival. The likelihood of  giving a zero for the 
survival probability increases in the number of  zeros on the other subjective 
probabilities, so that among those who have zeros on all six of the other subjec- 
tive probabilities, 30.4 percent gave a zero on the survival probability. One 
possible explanation for this result is that there are individual characteristics 
that make the probability of all these events truly low, approaching zero. How- 
ever, the nature of  the questions is that some of the events are desirable and 
would be positively correlated with socioeconomic status and other character- 269  Subjective Survival Curves and Life Cycle Behavior 
Number of 0's on Other Subjectives 
Fig. 9.8  Focal subjective responses: proportion with survival response zero 
istics, and some are undesirable and would be negatively correlated. For ex- 
ample, a rough judgment would put them into the following classification: 
Positive events 
Your income will keep up with inflation during the next five years? 
You will live to be at least A? (where A is the target age) 
You will leave a financial inheritance? 
You will move to a nursing home in the next five years? 
Medical expenses will use up all your savings sometime during the next 
You will have to give major financial help to family members during the 
Negative events 
five years? 
next 10 years? 
Neutral events 
You  will receive major financial help from family members during the 
You will move during the next five years? 
next 10 years? 
Someone with a small probability  of  using all his savings on medical ex- 
penses is likely to be in good health and to have adequate resources. Such a 
person is likely to have good survival chances and to leave an inheritance and, 
therefore, should give high probabilities to the questions about them. Indeed 
the raw correlation coefficient between the probability of medical expenses 
and the probability of survival is .13 and between medical expenses and leav- 
ing a financial inheritance is .18. 
Figure 9.9 has similar results where the focal point of the survival probabil- 
ity is 0.5. The average frequency of giving 0.5 is about 0.21, but among those 
who give no 0.5s on the other subjective probability questions the frequency 270  Michael Hurd, Daniel McFadden, and Li  Gan 
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Fig. 9.9  Focal subjective responses: proportion with survival response 0.5 
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Fig. 9.10  Focal subjective responses: proportion with survival response 1.0 
is just 0.13. It increases to 0.51 among the subjects who answered 0.5 to four 
other subjective  probability  questions. Figure 9.10 shows that the uncondi- 
tional frequency of giving 1  .O as the survival probability is about 0.17. Except 
for the fourth entry, which is based on 19 observations, there is a monotonic 
increase in the frequency as the number of 1.0s given on the other subjective 
probability questions increases, reaching 0.3. 
We interpret these results to be good evidence of an individual-level propen- 
sity to give focal-point responses. Although it seems unlikely that the patterns 
could be due to covariates or personal characteristics that are related to the 
probabilities of actual outcomes, we investigate this by a regression (logits) of 
the probability of giving a focal-point answer on the number of other focal- 
point answers (as above) and on a number of personal characteristics. That is, 
we estimate 271  Subjective Survival Curves and Life Cycle Behavior 
Table 9.2  Determinants of the Probability of Giving a Focal-Point Response (linear 
probability model for survival probabilities) 
Focal of 0.0  Focal of 0.5  Focal of 1.0 
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Source: Authors’ calculations from AHEAD. 
Notes: n  is the number of focal points with the same value on other subjective probabilities. The reference 
is n = 0, age 65-69,  female, good health, lowest wealth quartile, no cognitive impairment. S.E. = stan- 
dard error. 
where X is a vector of personal characteristics. Table 9.2 shows the results of 
the linear regressions. The first two columns have the coefficients and standard 
errors from the regression of a variable that takes the value one if the subjective 
survival probability is zero and takes the value zero otherwise. The important 
regressors are categorical variables (the ns)  that represent the number of zeros 
on the other seven subjective probabilities, age intervals, self-assessed health 
categories, health change, wealth quartiles, and a categorical variable that may 
indicate cognitive impairment. 
The table shows the same pattern by  n as figure 9.8: those with the fewest 272  Michael Hurd, Daniel McFadden, and Li Gan 
Table 9.3  Logit Probability of a Focal-Point Response (survival probabilities, 
base case except variable indicated) 
Variable 
Focal 

























































































~~  ~  ~~ 
Source  Authors’ calculations from AHEAD 
Note  n  IS the number of focal points with the same value on other Subjective probabilities  The 
base case IS n = 0, age 65-69,  female, good health, health same, lowest wealth quartile, no cogni- 
tive impairment 
responses of zero on the other subjective  probabilities have the lowest probabil- 
ity of  having a zero subjective survival probability: for example, if someone 
gave zeros on all seven of the other subjective probabilities, the likelihood of 
giving a zero on the survival probability is 0.459 greater than if he had no zeros 
on the other subjective probabilities. The other covariates show reasonable pat- 273  Subjective Survival Curves and Life Cycle Behavior 
terns. The probability of giving a zero increases with age and increases both at 
lower levels of self-assessed health and with worsening health. 
The next two columns have similar results where the left-hand variable takes 
the value one if the response to subjective survival is 0.5, and zero otherwise. 
Again the probability is strongly increasing in n, verifying the results of figure 
9.9. Unlike the case when the left-hand variables indicates a zero response, we 
have no particular prior beliefs about the pattern with age: the likelihood of 
responding with a 0.5 could increase with age because of increasing cognition 
difficulties, but it could decrease with age because the true probability of sur- 
vival (as measured by life tables) falls rapidly toward zero. Indeed, the empiri- 
cal outcome is that the probability of giving a focal response of 0.5 decreases 
in age and in poor health status and worsening health. The last two columns 
have the results for a focal response of  1.0. Again the probability is increasing 
in n. The age pattern is as expected: the older respondents are less likely. The 
variation by health level and health change is consistent with our other results. 
Our cognitive impairment indicator shows, when viewed across the three prob- 
abilities, that having an impairment increases the likelihood of giving a focal 
response of  1.0 compared with a focal response of  zero or 0.5. To the extent 
that cognitive impairment is an additional indicator of underlying health status 
the effect should be the opposite. That is, cognitive impairment increases the 
likelihood of  making an objectively incorrect assessment of  the probability 
of survival. 
Table 9.3 shows fitted probabilities from logistic estimation of the same rela- 
tionships. The pattern as n varies is the same as in table 9.2, but the magnitude 
of  the variation is attenuated. Now  it is quite close to the variation shown in 
figures 9.8 through 9.10. For example, the probability of  a focal response of 
zero varies by  about 0.21 as n varies from 0 to 6; in figure 9.8 the (uncon- 
ditional) variation  is 0.27. The table  shows that  the probabilities of  focal 
responses vary  substantially with the other covariates: as health varies from 
excellent  to  poor the  likelihood of  a  focal response of  zero increases by 
0.184 whereas the likelihood of a focal response of  1  .O  falls by 0.168. Having 
a cognitive impairment increases the likelihood of a focal response of  1  .O com- 
pared with the likelihood of a response of zero by about 0.05, which is not real- 
istic. 
9.4  A Model for Personal Survival Curves 
Each individual faces a survival curve, q(t  I  u,z,E),  giving the probability that 
remaining life will exceed t years. This curve will depend on the current age a 
of the individual and may depend on observed and unobserved covariates, de- 
noted by z and 8,  respectively. A rational individual who engages in life cycle 
planning will utilize subjective beliefs about this survival curve. For example, 
a life cycle optimizer who has a time-separable felicity function u(c,) of con- 274  Michael Hurd, Daniel McFadden, and Li Gan 
sumption at age a, a discount rate p, and no bequest motive and faces no uncer- 
tainty other than date of death will seek to maximize 
jO*u(ca+,) -  e-pf  . q(tIa,z,E)dt. 
The survival curve q is now interpreted as the subjective belief of the individual 
at age a. Suppose that the covariates (z,~)  influencing these beliefs are time 
invariant,  and  that  the  beliefs  are  intertemporally  consistent,  so  that 
q(t+.r  I  a,z,e) = q(t I  U,Z,E)  q(7  I  a+t,z,e). Then the optimization does not in- 
volve strategic consideration of possible changes in beliefs. The optimization 
is carried out subject to a given initial wealth W, and a condition that future 
wealth be nonnegative. The equation of motion of wealth is 
where yoit is annuity income and r is the interest rate. When wealth is positive 
over an interval [a,a+t), the optimal consumption stream satisfies 
The  individual  will  display  decreasing  consumption,  implying  decreasing 
wealth, if  Y - p - h(t I a,z,e) < 0, where h(t  I  U,Z,E) = -V,  log q(t  I  a,z,e) 
is the mortality hazard rate. More generally, the larger q(t I  u,z,E), the lower 
consumption and the larger net saving. Rising mortality hazard should then 
eventually  lead  among  survivors  to  declining  consumption  and  negative 
saving. 
A standard formulation of the life cycle savings model assumes that all indi- 
viduals of  the same age have a common survival curve that coincides with 
national life tables, and that the individuals know this curve, so there is no 
variation in subjective beliefs about survival. Then a parameterization of u(c) 
such as the constant relative risk aversion function u(c) = cL-y/(  1 -  y) allows 
the model above to be estimated from panel data. A qualitative characterization 
of the estimation results of Hurd (1990) and others is that there is less dissaving 
than might be expected with commonly assumed levels of risk aversion and no 
bequest motive, and substantially more variability in saving rates than a model 
with homogeneous preferences and survival curves would suggest. Explana- 
tions that have been offered for the relatively low rates of dissaving include 
strong bequest motives, high risk aversion toward the end of life, and unantici- 
pated taste changes, due say to health, that reduce the marginal utility of con- 
sumption. Another possible explanation, which also explains some of the high 
variability in saving rates, is that survival curves are heterogeneous, and selec- 
tion progressively removes individuals with low survival probabilities and high 
rates of dissaving, so that average wealth holdings of survivors do not decline 
rapidly with age. Heterogeneity in the degree of risk aversion and in bequest 
motives would also contribute to variability in saving behavior. 
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curve known to the individual, with the econometrician observing some but 
not all of the covariates that personalize this curve. We will assume that ques- 
tions about survival probabilities to specified ages provide information, not 
necessarily exact, on the personal survival curve. We use this information, plus 
covariates, to fit an  estimated personal survival curve for each individual in the 
AHEAD sample. In following sections, we investigate the link between this 
survival curve and saving behavior. 
Two critical assumptions will provide the foundation for our model of per- 
sonal survival curves. First, assume the personal survival curve of an individual 
can be represented by  a Cox  proportional  hazards survival curve at elapsed 
time t from initial age a, 
q(tIu,v,z,~)  = exp(-(A"(t  + a) - Av(a))ez@-"), 
where a is starting age, t is elapsed time, Av(a)  is an integrated baseline hazard 
function at age a for an individual born in year v,  measured starting from age 
zero, z are covariates, p are parameters, E  is a disturbance idiosyncratic to the 
individual that is normalized to have zero mean and unit variance, and cr  is a 
scale parameter. The second critical assumption regards the perceptual and 
reporting errors that  may  enter stated  subjective survival probabilities. We 
allow for the possibility that individuals may  be systematically optimistic or 
pessimistic by introducing time scale distortion, or accelerated failure time, in 
which individuals view their personal clocks as running faster or slower than 
the chronological clock. We  also consider the possibility of focal responses in 
reporting subjective probabilities. The details of  these assumptions are given 
later. 
9.4.1 
Selection determines the relationship between the personal survival curve 
q(t  I  a,v,z,~),  the expected survival curve Q(t  I  a,v,z)  of individuals of age a with 
observed covariates z,  and the population mean survival curve Q(t  I  a,v). Let 
f(E  10) denote the density at birth of  the unobserved factor E, and let g(z 10) 
denote the density at birth of the observed covariates z. Then 
The Algebra of Heterogeneous Personal Survival Curves 
Q(a  10, v,  z) =  q(a  10, v,  Z,E)  f(E IO)de, 
Q(a  10, v) = 1  Q(a  10,  v,  z)g(z 10) dz , 
the density of E among survivors of vintage v at age a, given z, is 
f(&Ia,v,z) = f(El0)  *  q(a1O,v,z,~)/Q(a10,v,z), 
and the density of z among survivors of vintage v at age a is 
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~~ 
Q(f  I  a, v, z) 
= jq(a+fla,v,z,&) ' f(EIa,V,Z)d& 
= J q(a +  f 10, v, z, E)  * f(& 10) d&/Q(U  10, v, z) 
= at  + a 10, v, z)/Q(a 10, v, z), 
and 
at  I  a,  v) 
= J at1 a,  v,  z)g(z I a,  v) dz 
= JJ q(a+tlO,v,z,E)  *  f(El0)  *  g(ZIO)d&dZ/Q(t10,V) 
= Q(t + a 10, v)/Q(a 10, v). 
Lets = cue,  and let k(s)  be the density of s  induced by the densityf(s I 0); that 
is, k(s) =  f(-log(s)/o  I O)/sa. Let +(r) = j,'-e-r,T*k(s)  ds be the Laplace trans- 
form of k.  Then 
Q(a  10, v, z) = I:f(&  10)  -  exp  (-Rv(a)eiP-uE  d& 
= I,"  k(s) *  exp (-h,(a)e%) ds  = +(A,,(a)e@). 
The density of s given a, z then satisfies 
k(sla,  v, z)  = k(s) 
+
  exp(-h,(a)e%)/$(h,,(a)eP). 
The moment-generating function m(r)  for the density k(s  I  a,v,qz) is 
m(r) = E{e"la,v,z}  = $(Ay(a)eLP - r)/~J~(h,,(a)e~P). 
From this, E(s  I a,z} = -*'(A,(a)e.P)/*(h,(a)e:p) and one has the moments 
V{logq(tIa,v,z,~)Ia,v,zJ  = [A.(t+a) - Av(a)l2  *  e2;P  -  M(z), 
with 
Similarly, let T = ezp-an, and letj(7) be its density induced by  the joint den- 
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Let 6(r)  denote the Laplace transform of j.  Then 
+m  +a0 
Q(a 10, v)  = j-  I_, f(~  I O)g(z 10)  -  exp(-A  v(a)ezP-uE)  d~  dz 
= I,”  j(T) *  eXp(-A,,(a)T)dT  = 6(hV(a)) 
and 
Q(tIu,v)  = Q(t+alO,v)/Q(alO,v)  = 6(Av(a+t))/6(hu(a)). 
Summarizing, selection thins the left tail off(&  I  a,v,z) relative to the right 
tail, as individuals with unfavorable draws of  E die out. As a result, Q(t I a,v,z) 
declines less rapidly with t than does q(t I U,V,Z,E)  for any fixed E. Similarly, 
selection thins the regions of  z that elevate mortality risk, so that  Q(t  I  a,v) 
declines less rapidly with t than does Q(t  I  a,v,z) for any fixed z. Further, selec- 
tion induces a correlation of  E  and z, so that combinations of  z that elevate 
mortality risk are among survivors positively associated with E. A completely 
consistent analysis of personal mortality risk that combines individual data and 
life table data for persons of different ages has to handle these selection effects. 
We do this by parameterizingj(7). 
A fundamental identification question is what can be learned about Ay(u)  in 
the presence of the unknown function 6.  For any increasing function p(r)  such 
that 6(p(r))  continues to have the properties of a Laplace transform, one clearly 
cannot distinguish the model with 6 and A,(a)  from the model with 6* and 
At(a)  that satisfies 6*(r) = 6(p(r))  and &(a)  = p-l(Av(u)).  Consequently, 
any  econometric specification that  attempts to estimate hv(a)  nonparamet- 
rically in combination with a parameterization of 6 that allows monotonically 
varying alternatives must fail. 
With this limitation in mind, we consider the parametric assumption that T 
has the gamma densityj(7) = wwTw-le-wT/r(w)  with mean one and variance 1/ 
w.  The Laplace transform of  this density is 6(r)  = (1 + r/w)-O. Consider a 
quadratic spline approximation to A,(a): 
I  I 
IJ 
t=l  ,=I  + CC.I,~(~ > A,)l(v  > V,)(a -  AJ2(v - V,), 
where the as are parameters, the A, are ages at five-year intervals defined so 
there are life table sample points below the lowest and above the highest Az, 
and the V, are vintages at 20-year intervals defined so there are life tables for 
vintages below the lowest and above the highest V,. This form then yields a 
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task is then to use life tables for different ages and vintages to determine the re- 
lationship 
[I + Rv(a)/w]-"  if w  > 0, 
exp(-A&))  if w  = 0. 
Q(al0,v)  = 
Recognizing that this model corresponds to a Box-Cox transformation, 
a computationally efficient way to carry out the estimation is by pseudomaxi- 
mum likelihood, treating the disturbance 5. as normal. The results of this esti- 
mation are that the likelihood is maximized over the interval w 2  0 consistent 
with the Laplace transform at the boundary value w = 0, corresponding to an 
absence of unobserved  heterogeneity.  In light of  the previous  discussion  of 
identification, this provides no real evidence for or against the presence  of 
heterogeneity in mortality hazard, but rather indicates that the spline approxi- 
mation to the integrated hazard is sufficiently flexible to capture the effects of 
heterogeneity, so that the additional parameter w is not needed to characterize 
the life tables. In the subsequent analysis, we use the fitted baseline integrated 
hazard function obtained from the regression of log Q(a I0,v) on AJa).  Keep 
in mind that this characterization then includes the average effect of popula- 
tion heterogeneity. 
9.4.2  Subjective Survival Probabilities 
If an individual knows that he or she has a personal survival curve given by 
the Cox proportional hazards form, with known covariates z and E, and with 
the baseline integrated hazard h,,(a),  and is fully rational, then this curve will 
enter life cycle savings decisions and may also provide the basis for reported 
subjective survival probabilities. Alternatively, individuals may not be fully ra- 
tional and instead may be systematically optimistic or pessimistic about sur- 
vival. We will parameterize this by allowing individuals to distort the scale of 
chronological time. An individual of age a who contemplates survival for an 
interval t is assumed to convert this to an equivalent value 
T,(t) =  (t +  1>,,+,,=  - 1, 
where a,  and a2  are parameters. This equivalent value will replace the chrono- 
logical interval t in the subjective survival curve. If a, = 1 and a2 = 0, there 
is no systematic bias about survival. If a, + a;a  < 1, then individuals are 
systematically optimistic, underestimating mortality risk over a time interval t. 
If a2  <  0, then individuals become more optimistic as they age. This specifica- 
tion  is a parametric  specialization  of  what is termed  an accelerated  failure 
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Time scale distortion may appear in individuals’ beliefs if they are not fully 
rational and may influence behavior. Thus, a systematically optimistic individ- 
ual  will be reluctant  to dissave, since wealth  will  have to be spread over a 
long anticipated remaining life. However, time scale distortion may be more 
superficial, affecting responses to survey questions on mortality without alter- 
ing beliefs. Context and framing effects appear in survey responses much less 
personal than survival and seem to be related to the persona individuals choose 
to project as well as to psychometric illusions. It is not difficult to imagine that 
these effects could distort reported  survival probabilities. Analysis of  subse- 
quent waves of the AHEAD panel should reveal the extent to which systematic 
distortion in stated survival probabilities infects behavior. 
Suppose the  subjective probability p*  of  surviving for elapsed  time T  is 
known for an individual. Then p* = exp( -(A,,(a + T,(T)) -  A,(a))ezP-u6)  de- 
termines 
UE =  -log(-logp*)  + zp + log(A,,(a + T,(T))  -A,,(u)). 
Substituting this in the survival curve, 
I.  s(tla,p*)  =  (p*):A”.+‘T”lT~~-*”(.I 
A .(a  + ‘T,(r))  -  A Ju) 
In subsequent analysis, we shall assume that the density at birth of the unob- 
served factor s = e-lrC is gamma with mean one and variance 1/~,  so that the 
subjective probability p* of survival over elapsed time T satisfies 
V = E{logp* la,z}  = -  [Av(a  + T(T))  - Av(a)]  -  ezP -  K/[K  + A,(a)ezP], 
A2  = V{logp*Ia,z] =  [AJa + T,(T)) - AV(a)]*  -  e2“  -  K /[K  + AV(a)ezPI2. 
Note that this distributional assumption on s is distinct from, although consis- 
tent with, the earlier assumption that the entire proportional hazard term in the 
Cox survival function at birth had a gamma distribution. In particular,  if the 
integrated hazard function were free of  the effects of heterogeneity, then one 
would expect the parameter K in the formula above to be larger than the param- 
eter o  in the formula for the life table probabilities. However, lack of identifi- 
cation makes this consistency check impossible. 
If the subjective probability p* were observed without error, then the nonlin- 
ear regression equation 
-logp*  = V - At 
= [A,,(a  + T,(T)) - Av(a)]  .  ePotzlPl  K/[K  + Av(a)eEP]  - Xt, 
which has ES  = 0 and ES2 = 1 by construction, could be used to estimate the 
parameters a,  p, and K. Note that positive 5 is associated with larger survival 
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9.4.3  Reporting Errors 
We  anticipate that stated subjective probabilities p will deviate from true 
(latent) subjective probabilities  p* due to two types of reporting errors, in addi- 
tion to systematic time distortion, which may be a reporting effect. First, we 
observe concentrations of responses at the focal points 0, 112, and 1 that appear 
to be the result of gross classification behavior by respondents. Second, there 
may be reporting noise in nonfocal responses. We now describe a model that 
includes these reporting errors. The model allows for the possibility of corre- 
lated unobserved factors that influence both the latent survival probability and 
the propensity to give focal responses. Small p* is associated with  V large 
positive, and hence with E large negative. There is a latent selection model 
w* = zy  + p5 + ?/1--+ 
that determines whether the individual gives a continuous nonfocal response 
or a focal response; p is a parameter that permits unobserved factors to influ- 
ence both “frailty” and the propensity to give a focal response. If w*  > 0, then 
the individual reports a continuous response p that satisfies 
v =  -1ogp  = v - xg + 6q 
- 
= [AJa  + T(T)) - Av(a)] ezS  *  K/[K  + RY(a)eZPl  -  + 6q, 
where q  is a disturbance arising from reporting noise that is assumed to have 
mean zero and variance one and 6 is a scale parameter. If  w*  5  0, then the 
individual reports a focal response determined by  threshold parameters IJJo and 
+,, with IJJo 5  IJJ, and 
if  v*  > -  IJJo, 
if  --IJJ0  2  v* 2 -+,, 
I 
if  v*  < -+,.  I1 
For further analysis, the disturbances 6,  v,  and q  are assumed to be independent 
standard normal. Note that this specification for 5 is an approximation that 
cannot be exact because of  the effects of selection. However, since the true 5 
matches the first two moments of the standard normal, we expect this approxi- 
mation to have no effect on the consistency of parameters estimated by nonlin- 
ear least squares and do not believe it will have any significant economic effect 
on the final estimated survival curves. 
9.4.4  Selection of Focal versus Nonfocal Response 
The marginal probability of a focal response, given z, is 
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Then, defining d+ to be an indicator for a nonfocal response, the marginal log 
likelihood for selection between focal versus nonfocal responses is 
The Likelihood of  a Nonfocal Response 
Given E, a nonfocal response v = -1ogp  is observed if  v > -(zy  + ps)/  dm  and q = (v -  V -  h6)/6. Unconditioning 6, the density of a nonfocal 
response v is then 
Then, the log density of p, conditioned on a, T,  z, and a nonfocal response, is 
I,  =  -log(p  *  @(zy)  *  JFz)  - log(-logp) 
When p = 0, this log density simplifies to 
In this case, consistent asymptotically normal estimates of the parameters are 
obtained by computing nonlinear least squares estimates for the regression 
-1ogp  = [(AJa  +  T(-T))  - A,(a)]  *  e@  -  K/[K  + Av(a)ezp]  + {, 
ignoring heteroscedasticity, then retrieving estimated residuals f and fitted val- 
ues $,  and finally applying ordinary least squares to the regression 
i2  =  ?/K  Z2  Cp, 
where cp  is a mean zero disturbance. The consistency of this procedure does 
not require that the disturbances 5 be normal. 
If p # 0 and 6, v are standard normal, a Heckman-type consistent estimator 
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E,(-logp)  =  V -  A  *  E(cIw* > 0) 
= [RJa + T,(T)) - hu(a)]  *  ezP  -  K/[K  + A,(a)e"] 
- PA  *  +(ZY)/%$, 
where EN  denotes an expectation conditioned on nonfocal response. Recalling 
that A2 = WK,  the regression can be rewritten 
-1ogp  = v  [l - (p/&)  *  +(zy)/@(zy)l  + 5. 
The inverse Mills ratio term in this regression comes from 
(v~w*)  -  N(V - pA(w* - ZY),  6'  + (1 - p*)A2), 
and E{w* -  zy  I w*  >  0) = +(zy)/@(zy).  Calculation of the variance yields 
A consistent test of  p = 0 can be carried out using the T-statistic on the term 
p/&  in  the second term of  the regression; a White robust estimator for the 
standard errors is used in calculating this statistic since the equation is hetero- 
scedastic. 
The Likelihood of a Focal Response 
given a focal response. Define the expressions 
We  next obtain the conditional log likelihood of an observed focal point p, 
7 
6,  =  + $,/v,  4 = @(bo), 
b, = &(I  + $,/V,  A, = @(b,), 
A, =  1 -A,,  A4  = A, -A,. 
The probability of the event w*  5 0 and V > -$", or a response p = 0, condi- 
tioned on the event of a focal response, is 
When  p = 0, this probability reduces to Po = A,,.  The second form of  the 
integral, obtained by the transformation of variables t = @(&)/A,, is convenient 
for numerical integration. 
Similarly, the probability of the event w*  5 0 and V < -$,,  or focal re- 
sponse p = 1, conditioned on the event of a focal response, is 283  Subjective Survival Curves and Life Cycle Behavior 
which reduces to PI  =  A, when p = 0. 
response p = 1/2, conditioned on the event of  a focal response, is 
Finally, the probability of the event w*  5  0 and  -+o  2  V 2  -+,,  or focal 
which reduces to P,,2 =  A,  when p = 0. 
Let do,  d,,,  and d,  be indicators for the events that observed p takes on the 
focal point values 0, 1/2, and  1, respectively. Then the conditional log likeli- 
hood of the observed focal point, given a focal response, is 
If = do  log4 + d,  -  log4 + d,,,  *  log<,, . 
When p = 0, this is an ordered probit model. 
9.4.5 
The final step of the analysis, once the parameters of  the model are esti- 
mated, is to estimate a subjective personal survival curve for each sample per- 
son. It is convenient to work with the log of the survival curve. Recall that 
Prediction of Personal Survival Curves 
To forecast this quantity, we replace log p* by its expectation, given z and given 
the stated subjective probability p. For the alternative that time distortion is 
interpreted as pure reporting error, T,(r) in this formula would be replaced by t. 
Consider the case p = 0. First consider nonfocal respondents. The conditional 
distribution of  -logp*  given v is normal with mean (Z2V + X2v)/(X2  + Z2) 
and variance X2S2/(X2 + 8?). Then the predicted personal survival curve is 
given by 
A,,(a + q(r)) - AJa)  . 6'V  + PV 
Av(a + q(7)) - A,(u)  X2  + 6,  ' 
-log  ij(r I  a, V,  L, p)  = 
It is of interest to single out two extreme cases. If  6 = 0, there is no reporting 
noise in nonfocal responses, and they identify the individual 5  effects. Then 284  Michael Hurd, Daniel McFadden, and Li Gan 
Alternatively, if  A = 0, corresponding to K = +-,  and the disturbance in the 
regression that maximizes IN is due to pure reporting noise, then 
-log+(tla,v,z,p)  = [A,,(a  + T,(T)) - Av(a)]  -  ez@ 
Finally, consider focal respondents in the case p = 0. These individuals have 
where b’(p)  and  b(p)  are the bounds  giving the  focal response p, so that 
(b’(p),b”(p))  is (  --,bO) for p  = 0, (b,,b,) for p  = 1/2, and (b,,  +-)  for p = 1. 
Then, for focal responses, the estimated personal survival curve is 
In the case of pure reporting noise, K = +M,  this formula reduces to the same 
estimated proportional hazards model that applied to the nonfocal respondents. 
Thus, in the case of pure reporting noise and p = 0, the stated survival proba- 
bilities are used only to calibrate the proportional hazards model in observ- 
able covariates. 
Finally, consider prediction of  personal survival curves when p # 0. First 
consider nonfocal respondents. The joint density of  -log  p*,  v, and w* is 
-log  p* 
W* 
V 
L  _I 
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The numerical integration formulas introduced for this case are required for 
evaluation of the denominator in this expression. Then 
9.5  Estimation Results 
This section gives estimates of the model developed in section 9.4. Table 9.4 
describes the covariates used in this analysis and gives their descriptive statis- 
tics. The estimates for the binomial probit model for focal response are given in 
table 9.5. Effects that increase the propensity for a focal response have positive 
coefficients. We  find that cognitive disability, fair or poor health, unmamed 
status, and missing data on other subjective probability questions are all associ- 
ated with significantly higher propensities to give a focal response, and high 
wealth  and  education are associated with  a  significantly lower propensity. 
Thus, focal responses appear to be associated with a lack of  aptitude for, or 
interest in, the survey. 
Table 9.6 reports the results of estimating the regression model 
-1ogp  = [AJa +  T,(T)) - A,(a)]  . ezp  -  K/[K  + Av(a)ezP]  + 5 
on the subsample of individuals who do not report a focal response of 0, 112, 
or 1. The integrated hazard function A,  is the quadratic spline approximation 
to life tables, quadratic in age with linear drift, as discussed earlier, with sepa- 
rate curves for males and females. A negative coefficient in this table is associ- Table 9.4  Definitions of Explanatory Variables 
Mnemonic  Description 
Sample 















Sex of respondent (male = 1, female = 0) 
Indicator for cognitive disability 
Race of respondent (black = 1, nonblack = 0) 
Indicator for self-reported excellent health 
Indicator for self-reported very good health 
Indicator for self-reported good health (omitted 
Indicator for self-reported fair health 
Indicator for self-reported poor health 
Indicator for improvement in health, last two years 
Indicator for no change in health, last two years 
Indicator for decline in health, last two years 















Father’s (expected) age at death 
PAPAGEI = PAPAGE*MALE, PAPAGEO = 
PAPAGE*(] -  MALE) 
Mother’s (expected) age at death 
MOMAGEI = MOMAGE*MALE, MOMAGEO = 
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Indicator for smoker now 
lndicator for previous smoker 
Indicator for married 
Subjective probability of nursing home admission 
Subjective probability of major medical expenditures 
Subjective probability of income lagging inflation 
Missing nursing home response 
Missing medical expenditure response 
Missing inflation response 
Indicator for 25-50  percent wealth quartile 
Indicator for 50-75  percent wealth quartile 
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Nore: Sample size = 6,139. 288  Michael Hurd, Daniel McFadden, and Li Gan 
Table 9.5  Binomial Probit Model for Focal Response 
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Notes: Dependent variable: focal = 1, nonfocal = 0. Estimation method is maximum likelihood 
estimation. 
ated with lower mortality hazard and a higher subjective probability of  sur- 
vival. We  estimate  this  model both  with and without  a correction  term for 
selection, which involves an inverse Mills ratio. Overall, we find a strong rela- 
tionship between  personal  survival probabilities  and covariates, generally in 
the expected direction. We find that males are more optimistic than females. 
Blacks are more optimistic than nonblacks.  Married individuals are slightly 
more optimistic than nonmarried ones. This may reflect both the objective fact 
that married individuals live longer and in many cases the impact on optimism 
of the death of  a spouse. We  do not find a significant relationship  between 289  Subjective Survival Curves and Life Cycle Behavior 
optimism about survival and either an index of cognition or an index of educa- 
tion. There is a strongly significant relationship between self-rated health sta- 
tus and survival expectations: those with better than good health (the omitted 
category) have sharply higher subjective probabilities, and those in worse than 
good health have sharply lower subjective probabilities. Changes in health sta- 
tus also influence optimism in the expected directions. Improvements in health 
status make respondents significantly more optimistic; declines in health status 
go the other way, but they are not statistically significant. 
Conventional wisdom is that individuals weigh the longevity of the same- 
sex parent heavily in forming their own survival expectations. We include the 
age of death of father and mother or, if surviving, the expected age of death 
conditioned on the age attained, calculated from standard life tables. These 
variables are interacted with the sex of the respondent;  then PAPAGE1 and 
MOMAGEO are the same-sex parental longevity variables. In all cases, greater 
parental longevity is associated with greater optimism. However, the only sta- 
tistically significant effect is that female optimism is higher when father’s lon- 
gevity is higher. These results then do not support the conventional wisdom on 
the effects of parental longevity. 
If the individual has been a smoker in the past, or is a smoker now, then the 
subjective survival probability is lower. However, the effects are not statisti- 
cally significant. These results go in the direction of clinical evidence, but do 
not appear to be strong enough to account rationally for the effect of smoking. 
This suggests that denial of mortality risk, or an attitude of imperviousness to 
danger, may  be part  of  smoking behavior. It is also possible that  self-rated 
health status captures some of the effects of smoking. 
Subjects gave subjective probabilities of moving to a nursing home within 
five years, of incurring medical costs within five years that would wipe out 
their savings, and of seeing inflation within five years that would erode their 
income. For the inflation variable, we find that a higher subjective probability 
of the event is associated with greater optimism about survival. This suggests 
that we are seeing in respondents’ behavior a rather carefully articulated calcu- 
lation of the probability of being at risk for these events as a result of survival, 
rather than heterogeneity in generalized optimism. For medical expenditure 
and nursing home variables, decreased optimism about mortality is associated 
with increased pessimism about the likelihood of nursing home admission or, 
less significantly, major medical costs. This is consistent with the conventional 
wisdom that individuals systematically overestimate the probability that their 
last days will be spent in a nursing home or extended hospital stay. There were 
a significant number of subjects with missing responses on these subjective 
probability questions; these events are flagged with dummy variables. If  re- 
sponses are missing at random, then the dummy variable coefficient should 
equal the coefficient for the variable in the case of nonmissing responses times 
the average level of the variable. For the nursing home question, the estimated 
coefficient is 0.3456, compared with the value 0.0576 that would be expected Table 9.6  Regression Model for Nonfocal Responses 
Model without Heckman Correction  Model with Heckman Correction 
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if the variable were missing at random. Thus, missing data here is associated 
with significantly more pessimism. For the inflation question,  the estimated 
coefficient  is  -0.4753,  compared with  the  expected value  -0.2746.  Thus, 
missing data on inflation is associated with significantly more optimism. This 
suggests that missing responses to these questions may be associated with an 
unwillingness to articulate pessimistic beliefs. 
The wealth of individuals is identified by quartile, with the lowest quartile 
as the omitted category. We find a clear, although not consistently statistically 
significant, pattern that moving from the second to the third to the top quartile 
increases optimism about survival. This pattern agrees with the observation at 
the aggregate level that increased wealth is associated with increased longevity, 
and with the life cycle model implication that individuals with higher subjec- 
tive survival probabilities should, other things equal, hold more assets. On the 
other hand, the lowest quartile, whose coefficient is implicitly zero, is more 
optimistic than the second quartile. This is inconsistent both with the observed 
negative correlation  of mortality risk with wealth and with the prediction of 
the life cycle model that optimism will be positively  correlated with wealth 
accumulation. One interpretation of the weak statistical relationship between 
wealth and stated survival probability is that a simple correlation of wealth and 
longevity in the population reflects in part the contribution of covariates such 
as health status and behavioral choices such as smoking that are accounted for 
in the model. Further, individuals in the lowest wealth quartile may be there in 
part because of beliefs that “fate” will provide not only long life but also the 
resources needed to live. 
The parameter  K in this model determines the spread of unobserved hetero- 
geneity at birth in the population.  The estimated  value  K  = 5.6460 implies 
that 90 percent of the values of s  from the density k(s)  describing unobserved 
heterogeneity lie in the interval (0.421,1.870). If this factor indeed measures 
heterogeneity in unobserved relative mortality risk, rather than a reporting ef- 
fect, and this factor is known to the consumer, then it has a potentially large 
economic effect on behavior. 
Consider the time-scaling function T,(r) = (1 + t)al+a?-o  -  1. For males, the 
estimated parameters a,  = 1.3137 and a2  = -0.0068  imply that individuals 
over age 46 are systematically  optimistic  about survival, and that optimism 
increases with age. The degree of optimism is substantial. For example, a 70- 
year-old  male has T,(t) = (1 + t)0.8377  -  1, and a time interval of 15 years is 
scaled to an equivalent of 9.2 years in the standard life table. An 80-year-old 
male has T,(t) = (1 + t)07697  - 1, and an interval of  15 years is scaled to an 
equivalent of 7.4 years in the standard life table. For females, the estimated 
parameters a,  = 1.2742 and a,  = -0.007  1 imply that individuals over age 39 
are optimistic; a 70-year-old scales a  15-year interval to 7.6 years, and a 80- 
year-old scales a 15-year interval to 5.6 years. If these are genuine beliefs about 
mortality  hazard,  then it is  not  surprising  that  individuals  hold  on to  their 
wealth to cover their expected remaining life. 293  Subjective Survival Curves and Life Cycle Behavior 
Table 9.7  Ordered Probit Model for Focal Points 
Standard 
Variable  Coefficient  Error  T-Statistic 
Low threshold  -  1.394  0.023  -60.530 
High threshold  -0.439  0.021  -20.824 
&  1.407  0.05 1  21.415 
Log likelihood  -3,486.25 
3,553 
Note:  Dependent variable: 0, 50, 100 for responses of 0, %,  1, respectively. 
When the model is estimated with a correction term for selection between 
nonfocal and focal responses, we find no statistical evidence for a common 
unobserved effect that causes the subjective survival probability to fall and the 
propensity for a focal response to rise. Further, the coefficients on covariates 
in the model are relatively unaffected, and the patterns of significant effects are 
unchanged. We  have chosen to maintain the hypothesis p = 0 for subsequent 
estimation and prediction tasks. 
An  estimate of  ti2 and a second estimate of  K  are obtained by  regressing 
squared residuals from the model in table 9.6 (without the correction for selec- 
tion) on a constant and the square of the fitted value of  the equation, p.  The 
estimate of  ti2 is 0.5401 (S.E. = 0.0476) and the estimate of  1/~  is 0.2385 
(S.E. = 0.0261), implying an estimate K = 4.1921. Then the heteroscedasticity 
in this regression equation appears to be consistent with the theoretical model, 
yielding an estimate of  K that is not far from the previous estimate. 
Estimates for the ordered probit model for observed focal points among 
those giving focal responses are given in table 9.7. In this estimation, the prob- 
ability of the observed focal point is given by  @(b”(p)) -  @(b’(p)),  where 
(-m,bo)  ifp =  0, 
(b’(p),b”(p))  =  (bo,b,)  ifp =  1/2,  I  (b,,+..)  if  p  =  1, 
and letting $’ denote the predicted value of  V from the regression on nonfocal 
responses, 
b,  = fi(1  + $o/v)  JK(1  + (J0/fi, 
b, = &(l  + $,/V)  = &(I  + +,/fi. 
The parameters +,,  and &  are estimated, using $’ as the covariate. This 
implies an estimate of  1.9796 for K,  compared with the regression model esti- 
mate of  5.6460. This difference is statistically significant (under the main- 
tained hypothesis p = O), using a standard error for &  that is not corrected for 
the use of an estimated variable. This result may then be a statistical artifact, 294  Michael Hurd, Daniel McFadden, and Li Gan 
Table 9.8  Fitted Survival Probabilities 
Nonfocal 
Respondents  Focal Respondents  All Respondents 
Age  Target  Life 
Group  Age  Table  Predicted  Stated  Predicted  Stated  Predicted  Stated 
Female 
70-74  85  0.588  0.532  0.500  0.481  0.516  0.503  0.509 
80-84  95  0.224  0.364  0.369  0.295  0.267  0.319  0.303 
75-79  90  0.425  0.454  0.440  0.363  0.353  0.400  0.388 
Male 
70-74  85  0.397  0.481  0.473  0.492  0.538  0.487  0.509 
75-79  90  0.250  0.391  0.371  0.382  0.392  0.386  0.382 
80-84  95  0.113  0.352  0.350  0.336  0.320  0.342  0.332 
1 
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Fig. 9.11  Survival curves: males aged 70 
or may indicate a specification problem in the model for focal-point choice or 
the impact of p # 0. 
Personal survival curves are predicted from the models estimated under the 
maintained hypothesis  p = 0. We produce estimates for the general case in 
which there is both unobserved heterogeneity in latent personal survival curves 
(e.g., K < +m)  and reporting error in nonfocal responses (6 > 0). The value 
of  A2, obtained from the formula A*  = V/K  using estimates from the model in 
table 9.6 without correction for selection, is approximately 0.77 13, which with 
the estimate S2 = 0.5401 implies that the general case predictor places about 
59 percent weight on the stated survival probability and 41 percent weight on 
the fitted proportional hazards model. Thus, this model indicates substantial, 
but imperfect, information in the stated probabilities. Table 9.8 summarizes 
these results. In figures 9.11 through 9.14, we plot average predicted personal 
survival curves for age 70 and age 80 females and males in the sample. For 1 
0 
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Fig. 9.12  Survival curves: females aged 70 
\  1  1 Life Table 
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Fig. 9.13  Survival curves: males aged 80 
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Table 9.9  Subjective Relative Risks (for a 70-year-old with a 0.54 probability of 
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-3.94 
comparison, we plot the standard life table survival curves in each case. The 
predicted  personal  survival curves become progressively  more optimistic as 
duration increases. Since the effects of selection should lead an average per- 
sonal survival function to decline more steeply than the life table curve, this 
illustrates the increasing optimism with duration that is present in personal be- 
liefs. 
To summarize the estimation results for the effects of covariates, table 9.9 
gives the perceived relative risks associated with various risk factors. The com- 
putation is done for an individual aged 70 who has a perceived probability of 
0.54 of  living  to age 85. The perceived relative risk is calculated  from the 
formula 297  Subjective Survival Curves and Life Cycle Behavior 
where 2, E correspond to a base case, here specified so that q(t  I  u,v,z,~)  = 0.54, 
and Az is the change in covariates from the base case. The table shows, first, 
strong relative risks associated with self-reported health status, compared to 
the baseline of good health, and also with changes in health status. Other eco- 
nomically significant relative subjective risk factors are father’s age of death 
(for women), marital status, subjective probability of nursing home admission 
or inflation, and low but not bottom wealth quartile. 
9.6  Subjective Mortality Risk and Saving Behavior 
Subjective measures of mortality risk appear to be useful in forecasting the 
survival probabilities of individuals. Cumulative experience with mortality in 
the AHEAD panel will determine whether the heterogeneity in perceived risk 
has a real counterpart. The primary economic interest in these stated beliefs is 
whether they influence, or at least vary with, economic behavior. There are a 
number of areas where these beliefs might matter, ranging from willingness to 
go to a doctor, and discretionary adjustments in exposure to risk factors such 
as smoking, to estate planning and saving behavior. 
In this paper, we take a preliminary, and simplistic, look at the relationship 
between stated saving behavior and beliefs about survival. It is well known that 
saving is positively related to income and wealth, with substantial variability. 
The  life  cycle model  predicts  that  under  most  circumstances,  saving rate 
should be positively correlated with objective probabilities of survival for vari- 
ous intervals, or with  life expectancy, since remaining  wealth needs to be 
spread over a longer remaining lifetime. The AHEAD wave 1 survey collects 
qualitative information on whether each respondent is (a) a net saver, (b) a zero 
saver, or (c) a net dissaver. Saving is defined to exclude contributions to trusts; 
this is appropriate for assets intended as bequests but is arguably inappropriate 
for trusts that are revocable or that are established to shelter unintended be- 
quests. (Continuous responses on saving are highly erratic, with many cases of 
missing or implausible data, and have not been used.) The survey questions are 
ambiguous on whether saving is net of  current interest, dividends, and real 
capital gains. Thus, an individual who consumes asset income while keeping 
real principal intact may report dissaving, even though there is none from a life 
cycle point of view. 
We use a simple ordered probit to ask whether, in addition to the usual in- 
come and wealth effects, saving varies systematically with the predicted sub- 
jective survival probability that takes into account individual stated percep- 
tions of mortality risk. We are particularly interested in the nuance of this hy- 
pothesis that says individuals respond behaviorally to perceptions rather than 
to  life table  survival probabilities.  The estimates  are  given in  tables  9.10 Table 9.10  Survival Probability and Saving for Individuals (ordered probit) 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
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Notes: Dependent variable is negative (-I),  zero, or positive (+  1) saving. S.E. = standard error. 
AIQUART2, AIQUART3, and AIQUART4 are indicators for quartiles of the distribution of annuity income. 
WHI&AILO is an indicator for above-median wealth and below-median annuity income. 
LIFESP is the life table survival probability,  12.5 years ahead, for the individual. 
SUBJSP is the predicted subjective survival probability,  12.5 years ahead, for the individual. 
RPTSP is the reported subjective survival probability,  12.5 years ahead, for the individual. 
THRESHOLD1 is the threshold parameter for the +  1 saving category; the threshold for the -  1 category is normalized to zero. 299  Subjective Survival Curves and Life Cycle Behavior 
through 9.12. Table 9.10 gives results for all individuals in the sample, with 
single-person  households and each person  in two-person households treated 
as individual observations. The explanatory  variables are household  annuity 
income; household wealth; the life table probability for the individual of sur- 
viving 12.5 years beyond current age; the predicted subjective survival proba- 
bility for the individual in 12.5 years, computed using his or her covariates and 
stated survival probabilities, under the maintained hypothesis that  p = 0, as 
outlined in section 9.4 and used in the construction of table 9.9; and the “raw” 
stated subjective survival probability (to an age that is 10 to 15 years ahead, 
depending on current  age). Income and wealth are classified  by quartile to 
reduce the effects of measurement error and spurious correlation. This model 
takes no account of the interdependence  of saving decisions of different family 
members. We find that  the probability of  saving rises  significantly  with in- 
creased income or wealth. One would expect less savings when wealth is high 
and annuity income is low; the coefficient has the expected sign but is insig- 
nificant. Higher life table survival probabilities are associated with less saving, 
contrary to the predictions of the life cycle model (model 2). However, in mod- 
els that contain both the life table survival probability and the predicted sur- 
vival probability based on the individual’s subjective response, it is the latter 
variable that has explanatory power, with the expected sign. In particular, when 
the subjective survival probability is entered as a deviation from the life table 
survival probability, or as a ratio to this probability, then only the difference or 
ratio is statistically significant (models 3 and 5). Thus, these results suggest 
strongly that saving behavior is responding to subjective beliefs about personal 
mortality risk, rather than to life table hazards. The relationship is economi- 
cally as well as statistically significant. The proportion of individuals selecting 
positive saving will vary by 22.0 percent as the subjective probability of sur- 
vival varies from its upper limit of one to its lower limit of zero (model 3). The 
regressions establish that the “raw” subjective response has no added explana- 
tory power, once the fitted survival probability is included in the model (model 
4). This provides at least weak evidence that focal responses are a reporting 
bias rather than a true belief that drives behavior, and it supports our approach 
of estimating latent beliefs for focal respondents. An important research impli- 
cation is that the subjective survival curves appear to have some power to ex- 
plain saving behavior. A possible policy implication is that the upward bias in 
subjective survival probabilities,  increasing  with  age, will  retard  dissaving. 
This could lead to what appears to be large bequest or precautionary  saving 
motives and may provide a partial explanation for the stylized fact that people 
accumulate too little and then save too much to be consistent with the most 
simplistic life cycle model. 
An analysis that pools individuals whether they are single or members of a 
couple overlooks the interdependence  of decisions within a household. More 
critically, it fails to account for the rather different joint survival calculations 
facing a couple compared with those facing a single person, or for the possibil- 300  Michael Hurd, Daniel McFadden, and Li Gan 
ity that preferences of singles and couples are different. Table 9.11 looks only 
at single-person households. Saving of these individuals increases significantly 
as a function of income or wealth, with significantly less saving from individu- 
als with high wealth and low annuity income. Saving by males is higher than 
that of females, other things equal. This effect may be due to the problems 
faced by widows in reconciling consumption habits with reduced income fol- 
lowing the death of the spouse. We find no significant effect of either life table 
or subjective survival probabilities, although the coefficient on the subjective 
survival probability is positive, as predicted by the life cycle model. The eco- 
nomic effect of subjective mortality risk, yielding a 19.0 percent swing in the 
probability of positive saving when the subjective probability varies from the 
extreme of one to the extreme of zero, goes in the direction consistent with the 
life cycle model and is not  strikingly different from this percentage  for all 
pooled individuals. 
Table 9.12 examines the saving behavior of couples, where each couple is 
treated as a single decision-making  unit. Again, income and wealth are sig- 
nificantly positively correlated with saving. To analyze the effects of mortality 
hazards, it is necessary to take account of the probabilities that both members 
will survive and that at least one will survive. For survival for a specific future 
time interval. one has 
Prob(Both survive) = Prob(Husband survives). Prob(Wife survives), 
Prob(Exact1y one survives) = Prob(Husband survives).  Prob(Wife dies) 
+ Prob(Husband dies). Prob(Wife survives), 
Prob(0ne or more survives) = 1 -  Prob(Husband dies).Prob(Wife dies). 
Saving behavior may depend on one or more of these joint probabilities. In 
reality, the saving calculation may be even more complex, as the order of death 
is likely to influence the annuity income stream. Of course, treatment of the 
life cycle mortality risk as a dynamic stochastic programming  exercise also 
complicates the analysis. 
In table 9.12, model 2 shows that saving increases with the subjective proba- 
bility that at least one member of the household will survive 12.5 more years; 
this effect is significant, and the life table probability of this event is insignifi- 
cant. The economic impact is substantial: as the subjective probability of at 
least one survivor varies from the extreme of zero to one, the probability of 
positive saving varies by 30.6 percent. In model 3, the survival probabilities of 
the male and female are entered separately. Again, the life table probabilities 
are insignificant, while the subjective probabilities are jointly significant at the 
95 percent level. (The coefficients are not individually significant due to their 
high correlation.) Model 4 distinguishes the events that both members survive 
for 12.5 years, that the male only survives, and that the female only survives. Table 9.11  Survival Probability and Saving for Singles (ordered probit) 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
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0.1862 
Notes; Dependent variable is negative (- l),  zero, or positive (+  1) saving. S.E. = standard error. 
AIQUART2, AIQUART3, and AIQUART4 are indicators for quartiles of the distribution of annuity income. 
WHI&AILO is an indicator for above-median wealth and below-median annuity income. 
LIFESP is the life table survival probability, 12.5 years ahead, for the individual. 
SUBJSP is the predicted subjective survival probability, 12.5 years ahead, for the individual. 
WSP  is the reported subjective survival probability, 12.5 years ahead, for the individual. 
THRESHOLD1 is the threshold parameter for the +  1 saving category; the threshold for the -  I category is normalized to zero. Table 9.12  Survival Probability and Saving for Couples (ordered probit) 
Variable 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 









SUBJSP12 -  LIFESP12 
LIFESPM 
LIFESPF 
SUBJSPM -  LIFESPM 
SUBJSPF -  LIFESPF 
LIFESPB 
LIFESPM I 
LIFESPF  I 
SUBJSPB -  LIFESPB 
SUBJSPMI -  LIFESPMI 
SUBJSPFI -  LIFESPFl 
CONSTANT 
THRESHOLD1 
0.0019  0.1069  0.0174  0.0016 
0.2906  0.1123  2.5877  0.2854 
0.6202  0.1109  5.5945  0.6125 
0.3379  0.1387  -2.4369  -0.3468 
-0.2359  0.1338  -  1.7633  -0.2332 
0.0579  0.1349  0.4292  0.0573 
0.0395  0.1532  0.2576  0.0442 
0.2890 
-0.0275 
0.6938  0.1339  5.1796  0.7101 
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2.5248  0.2906 
5.4577  0.6145 
-2.4619  -0.3421 
-1.8536  -0.2515 
0.3544  0.0462 











4.8563  0.8071 
31.6741  1.3687 
0.1081  0.0745 
0.1134  2.5629 
0.1123  5.4723 
0.1396  -2.4515 
0.1346  -1.8681 
0.1352  0.3416 
0.1537  0.1757 
0.2920  -0.5832 
0.3987  -  1.0844 
0.3086  -0.1859 
0.1550  2.7197 
0.  I 808  0.5574 
0.1983  0.5778 
0.1897  4.2544 
0.0432  31.6739 Log likelihood  -1.483.1 
N  1,498 
1,479.8 
1,498 





Share of -  1  0.1816  0.1816  0.1816  0.1816 
Share of +I  0.3498  0.3498  0.3498  0.3498 
Notes: Dependent variable is negative (-I),  zero, or positive (+  I) saving. S.E. = standard error. 
AIQUARTZ, AIQUART3, and AIQUART4 are indicators for quartiles of the distribution of annuity income. 
WHI&AILO is an indicator for above-median wealth and below-median annuity income. 
LIFESP12 is the life table survival probability, 12.5 years ahead, for one or both members of the couple. 
SUBJSP12 is the predicted subjective survival probability, 12.5 years ahead, for one or both members of the couple. 
LIFESPM is the life table survival probability, 12.5 years ahead, for the male. 
SUBJSPM is the predicted subjective survival probability, 12.5 years ahead, for the male. 
LIFESPF is the life table survival probability, 12.5 years ahead, for the female. 
SUBJSPF is the predicted subjective survival probability, 12.5 years ahead, for the female. 
LIFESPB is the life table survival probability, 12.5 years ahead, for both members of the couple. 
SUBJSPB is the predicted subjective survival probability, 12.5 years ahead, for both members of the couple. 
LIFESPMI is the life table survival probability, 12.5 years ahead, of the male only. 
SUBJSPMI is the predicted subjective survival probability, 12.5 years ahead, of the male only. 
LIFESPFI  is the life table survival probability, 12.5 years ahead, of the female only. 
SUBJSPFI is the predicted subjective survival probability, 12.5 years ahead, of the female only. 
THRESHOLD1 is the threshold parameter for the +I saving category; the threshold for the -  1 category is normalized to zero. 304  Michael Hurd, Daniel McFadden, and Li Gan 
Saving is found to rise significantly with the subjective joint survival probabil- 
ity, and to increase insignificantly with the probabilities of the remaining two 
events. These results suggest that saving behavior of couples fails to give the 
life cycle planning of a surviving spouse as much weight as the planning in the 
event of joint survival. A possible explanation is that saving decisions may be 
dominated by males who are unwarrantedly optimistic about their own survival 
and thus underestimate the probability of the event that their widows will have 
substantial life cycle requirements. 
Several cautions should be kept in mind in assessing the results in tables 
9.10 through 9.12. As noted, the definition  of positive or negative  saving is 
somewhat ambiguous and may be misinterpreted by some subjects. We have 
not accounted for factors that may influence bequest motives, such as the num- 
ber and economic status of relatives. We have not taken into account the possi- 
bility of reverse causality, where poor health that lowers the personal survival 
probability  is associated  with  medical  expenditures that  require  dissaving. 
There are substantial  questions about  the accuracy  of  reported  saving  and 
wealth data in elderly populations. Selection is potentially a severe problem, 
as the sample selects individuals who do not have sufficient impairments  to 
require proxy respondents, and who as a consequence may have higher survival 
probabilities and fewer current medical expenditures that drain savings. More 
definitive tests of whether there is informational value added in personal proba- 
bilities, beyond that contained in life tables, will rely on changes in wealth over 
time. As further waves of AHEAD become available, these tests will become 
possible. 
9.7  Conclusions 
This paper has examined the characteristics of survival probabilities stated 
by AHEAD respondents, particularly their relationship to standard life tables 
and their relationship to stated saving behavior. We find that stated probabilities 
are distorted by focal points. The evidence from the model is that there is in 
addition reporting error in nonfocal responses, but that this error is small rela- 
tive to variation  in individual  heterogeneity.  We conclude that  nonfocal  re- 
sponses can be used with relatively minor adjustments to predict personal sur- 
vival  curves. More substantial  adjustments  are required  to predict  survival 
curves for focal respondents. With or without adjustment, subjective survival 
probabilities show expected variations with known relative risks and increas- 
ing optimism with increasing  age. Future waves of the AHEAD survey will 
reveal the actual information content of these probabilities for survival. How- 
ever, it is clear that in aggregate it will be necessary to adjust personal survival 
probabilities down as age rises in order to track aggregate survival statistics. 
Our preliminary analysis of the relationship between personal survival prob- 
abilities and saving suggests that there is a significant positive correlation, and 
that consumers are responding to subjective beliefs about mortality rather than 305  Subjective Survival Curves and Life Cycle Behavior 
to life table probabilities.  This tie, combined with the optimistic bias about 
survival that increases with age, gives one explanation for the fact that saving 
rates do not fall as rapidly with age as a classical life cycle model would sug- 
gest. Thus, this phenomenon may be in part due to a bias in perception, rather 
than to strong precautionary or bequest motives. 
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Comment  Axel Borsch-Supan 
When  I saw the title of this paper I was reminded of a menu in a three-star 
restaurant, headed by three chefs, so I was very curious and forward looking. 
And, alas, the first course did what an hors d’oeuvre is supposed to: generate 
appetite.  First, it showed the general  importance  of  the subject. Almost all 
our behavioral  models  use  expectations.  This is particularly  stark  in  life- 
cycle-based  models. As inputs, we need the paths of expected income streams 
and expected major fixed expenditures; and we need expected lifetime. 
The conventional way  is to employ population averages for these expecta- 
tions, sometimes stratified  or taken as predictions  from regressions,  for ex- 
ample, earnings regressions. In terms of expected life span, this amounts to 
using (un)conditional life tables. The use of population averages can be moti- 
vated by  learning. The authors of this paper stress learning from one’s own 
experience, relevant for, say, repeated purchases of consumer goods, and they 
are therefore skeptical about using life tables as approximations for expected 
life span-a  singular event for anybody. However, one can also learn from 
other peoples’  experiences, even from other peoples’  life spans. Manski has 
provided a formal proof of the conditions that generate consistent expectations 
by learning from others: the authors are certainly aware of this literature, but I 
think it is relevant also for this paper. 
The authors take a different route and propose a-at  least for economists- 
rather unconventional way  to infer peoples’ expectations. They exploit what 
people answer when they are asked about their expectations. Economists have 
been rather skeptical about this method. First, subjects may just be reluctant to 
reveal their expectations,  specifically about their own life expectancy, partly 
because of superstition, partly because of  “Verdrangung.” Second, cognitive 
dissonance between own beliefs and own actions may lead to biased answers 
vis-;-,is  individual behavior: people may act according to population averages 
although they do not concede the truth to themselves (and the interviewer). 
Everybody feels like an above average car driver, for example. Finally, people 
may give strategic answers when they are asked to reveal their beliefs. I actu- 
ally think that this problem is of least importance, but it creates the most fun 
for economists. 
The authors try  to disprove this  skepticism by correlating  the  survey  re- 
sponses  to  life  table  and  epidemiological  data.  Preliminary  evaluation  of 
Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) responses shows an astounding coinci- 
dence with such life tables. Even  more important,  the covariance with risk 
factors such as smoking and drinking corresponds precisely with the epidemio- 
logical evidence. 
Whether these HRS results also obtain in the data from the survey of Asset 
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and Health Dynamics among the Oldest Old (AHEAD) is a nontrivial question 
because the AHEAD sample is much older. Indeed, as table 9.1 shows, the 
younger ages’ subjective survival probabilities are in line with life tables, while 
the older ages’ are far too optimistic. This reflects a common problem in empir- 
ical analysis:  if we find coincidence with  the life table data, the subjective 
probabilities have little added information; if we do not, we do not know how 
reliable the new information is. At  the least,  we need  more data and more 
waves in order to believe in the stability of the results of table 9.1. Better, we 
need to perform more experiments to find out what typical response patterns 
are. I will come back to this point later. 
The authors are careful to address two statistical problems that may hinder 
a direct interpretation  of the answers to questions about subjective probabili- 
ties. First, sample selectivity goes in the same direction as exaggerated opti- 
mism because people who have private information about an above average 
life expectancy will survive longer. The second statistical issue is the frequency 
of focal-point responses, that is, survival probabilities of exactly zero, 0.5, and 
1  .O. Incidentally, such responses are also frequent in the HRS but do not bias 
the averages there! The authors provide some insight in the correlation among 
focal-point answers and a selection of covariates. However, they do not analyze 
the relation between the number of focal-point answers and the respondent’s 
characteristics, say, in a count data model. Because there may be an unobserved 
trait generating focal-point  answers, the analysis in table 9.2 may  be biased 
because it takes the number of other focal-point answers as exogenous. 
It is very important for the analysis later in the paper to know whether focal- 
point answers are to be treated as round-off errors or as an expression of cogni- 
tive dissonance. To strengthen the econometrician’s belief in the informational 
content of  the beliefs of  those being economeasured,  the  data collectors in 
AHEAD should do more testing and retesting, for example, by asking the same 
question in different sections of the questionnaire and by asking questions once 
in a positive and once in a negative formulation. It is important to verify that 
the focal points switch accordingly and that the subjective probabilities are 
consistent. Of course, this cannot be done in the entire AHEAD sample. Psy- 
chometricians have done a lot of work in experiments  on those issues, and 
economists are beginning to realize that one can learn a lot from these experi- 
ments. This literature is-inappropriately-completely  absent in this paper. 
The statistical problems of sample selectivity and focal points require econo- 
metric treatment. The main point of this paper is to show that the raw data need 
some smoothing before they can fruitfully be used in economic analyses. 
This brings me to the second hors d‘oeuvre. A second hors d’oeuvre is usu- 
ally a very light one, a sorbet or-fashionable  in these days in my region-a 
glass of  vinegar made from Trockenbeerenauslese. The one here is anything 
but light. It is a structural model of how to relate the observed subjective proba- 
bilities  to  covariates,  where  the  subjective  probabilities  are  interpreted  as 
points on each individual’s own survival curve. The task is to fit these personal- 308  Michael Hurd, Daniel McFadden, and Li Gan 
ized survival curves taking account of observed heterogeneity-using  the co- 
variates provided in the data-as  well as unobserved heterogeneity creating se- 
lectivity. 
The methodology is fairly involved. The statistical model has two compo- 
nents.  The first component models  the  selection process that  describes true 
beliefs, while the second component links true beliefs to those measured with 
error  and/or  as focal-point  answers.  The selection  model  starts with unob- 
served heterogeneity that  is fixed at the time of birth. People have different 
traits that make them once and for all more or less resilient. Modeled as gamma 
distributed, this heterogeneity generates a likelihood of observing a nonfocal- 
point answer not subject to measurement error. I am not sure the authors con- 
vinced me that predisposition is what fixes the survival probability of an entire 
life.  I would  rather have it modeled  as a random  walk in which  shocks hit 
individuals,  say,  drawn from a  Poisson distribution  with covariates such as 
smoking, and thereby select individuals out of the sample once a certain thresh- 
old is passed. 
The second component models the transformation  of an exact continuous 
probability response to one that is measured with error or truncated to a focal 
point. The authors’ model is very general and permits a rather flexible correla- 
tion pattern between  measurement  errors and classification errors into focal 
points, although they do not estimate the model in its full generality. 
The model arrives at three pieces to estimate: a binomial probit model that 
separates  focal-point  from nonfocal-point  responses,  a nonlinear  regression 
model of (potentially mismeasured) nonfocal-point responses, and an ordered 
probit model describing the three focal points. 
The regression model is derived from three assumptions: a Cox proportional 
separation of baseline and individual hazard, a Weibull baseline modified by 
the survival selection process, and the result of the parametric unobserved het- 
erogeneity  fixing resiliency  at birth. Taking logarithms  yields the nonlinear 
regression equation, the main empirical result of the paper, table 9.6. 
The results  in this table show  some reasonable  covariation, for example, 
with health. Also the wealth pattern conforms to our priors: the wealthier have 
higher subjective survival rates. But table 9.6 also contains a host of surprises. 
Males and blacks have higher  survival probabilities,  in contradiction  to the 
evidence. The ages of mother and father do not matter even though we know 
that they are powerful predictors of life expectancy that appear to be widely 
used as such. 
The authors are aware of this. However, they change their interpretation by 
now talking about “optimism about survival” rather than “survival” as such. 
The careful reader recognizes that this is less than consistent with the first part 
of the paper in which responses in the HRS were proudly taken at face value. 
The credibility of this second part of the paper would improve if the authors 
would give the reader some idea of  how well this procedure works. Since the 
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tive probabilities-that  is, finding a balance between believing in the subjec- 
tive survival probabilities as they are stated and massaging them using prior 
structural assumptions-any  kind  of  validation  would be helpful.  One way 
would be to use a hold-out sample for the purpose of validation. Another way, 
of course, is to be patient and see whether the subjects in the panel will display 
actual mortality in accordance to their beliefs. 
Just as an aside, I would like to raise a flag when I see wealth included in 
this regression-I  will come back to this identification  problem during the 
main course of this feast. 
Indeed, the main course promises to be  gorgeous:  “Subjective  Mortality 
Risk and Saving Behavior.” Unfortunately, it comes on a small plate. For all I 
can get from this glimpse at the stated main purpose of  the paper, my taste 
buds are a little imtated. 
The idea behind this main part is straightforward. The authors plug the pre- 
dicted subjective survival probabilities  into the maximand  of  the  life cycle 
problem, derive the implied saving-to-wealth ratio, and investigate its correla- 
tion to the observed  saving-to-wealth  ratio by  a simple regression.  If  more 
waves of data had been available, the authors could have fed them directly into 
the first-order conditions that were spelled out in the first part of the paper and 
could have compared the predicted with the observed saving paths. 
This sounds very reasonable. I have two problems. Unfortunately, the paper 
is not specific about what subsample is really used for this exercise-focal- 
point and/or nonfocal-point respondents?-and  does not describe what is used 
as a predictor for the smoothed subjective survival probability. 
My second problem relates to the identification problem mentioned above 
and the authors’ criticism of identifying functional form restrictions by other 
authors at the beginning  of  the paper. The personalized  survival curve is a 
function of wealth, but wealth is accumulated according to a trajectory deter- 
mined by expectations about life span. The authors successfully endogenized 
mortality and described wealth at the same time. Hence, their approach cannot 
relieve us from identification by functional form. This third and somewhat ru- 
dimentary part of the paper  should therefore spell out what exactly can be 
identified, either by functional form or by suitable instruments. 
The results in table 9.10 are disappointing. No R2  is reported, but it appears 
to be very low. The two factors are insignificant. However, it is important to 
stress that the set of savings data in this first AHEAD wave is a pure substitute 
to what an economist wants. The poor performance  visible in table 9.10 is 
likely to reflect this more than anything else. 
Thus, after these two mouth-watering hors d‘oeuvres, I am particularly hun- 
gry and forward looking to a full main course and a selection of desserts once 
the authors have reliable data that permit them to test the link to their carefully 
processed subjective survival probabilities. 